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CASE NOTES
Labor Law—Agency Shop Agreements—Federal Preemption Doctrine.—
Higgins v. Cardinal Manufacturing Campany. 1—The appellants, as non-
union employees of the Cardinal Manufacturing Company (an interstate
concern), are subject to a collective bargaining agreement which contains
an agency shop provision. For an alleged violation of the Kansas right-to-
work amendment the appellants sought and received from the state district
court a temporary restraining order which prohibited the president of the
manufacturing company from discharging the appellants for their failure
to pay the appellee union an amount of money equal to that paid by the
union members for initiation fees, union dues, and assessments. The union
and the employer thereupon filed a motion to dissolve the order alleging
want of jurisdiction of the state court under the Labor Management Rela-
tions Ace and the insufficiency of the petition to state a cause of action under
Kansas law. The trial court sustained the motion as to the petition failing
to state a cause of action, but overruled it on the jurisdictional ground. On
cross appeals the Supreme Court of Kansas HELD: The Kansas right-to-
work amendment, having been properly adopted under the Taft-Hartley
Act, serves to prohibit the application of an agency shop agreement. The
court further stated that the enforcement of any violation of the amendment
is not within the exclusive domain of the National Labor Relations Board
by virtue of the federal preemption doctrine.
Since union security agreements 4 were not mentioned in the Wagner
Act,3 closed, union, or agency shops were legal tools in the hands of the
union, and were wielded to secure and maintain the union as a strong and
exclusive bargaining unit' In 1947, this pro-union situation was sharply
altered by the passage of section 8(a) (3) of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act (Taft-Hartley Act).' This section declared it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to hiring employees by
conditioning said employment on membership in a labor organization. But
this restriction was eased by a proviso in this section allowing an employer
to make an agreement with a labor organization to require, as a condition
1 360 P.2d 456 (Kan. 1961).
2 Kan. Const. art. 15, § 12 (1958).
3 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 141 et. seq. (1958).
4 "Union security is a term of common usage not readily susceptible to precise
definition, but as used here, the terms mean 'those provisions in a contract, and speci-
fically in a collective bargaining agreement which are demanded by the Union for the
protection of the Union as a separate entity.'"
"Union security provisions include those clauses relative to maintenance of member-
ship, and check-off of dues, or other payments to the Union. In conflicts concerning
union security provisions, the antagonists are organized labor and organized management,
and no individual employee is involved, except in his capacity as a member of a group."
27 J.B.A. Kan. 348 (1959).
6 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-58,
159-66 (1935).
6 See Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336
U.S. 301, 307-10 (1949).
7 Supra note 3.
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of employment, union membership after 30 days of work. By a further
proviso, an employer would be discriminating if he discharged an employee
for not being a union member, if said employee was denied membership for
any reason other than the failure to pay dues and fees.8
 Under section
14(b),2
 Congress granted to the states authority to ban union shop agree-
ments. Taken together, sections 8(a) (3) and 14(6) furnish the states with
the choice of limiting conditions of employment to the payment of dues and
fees, prohibiting union shops entirely, or doing nothing and thus letting
section 8(a) (3) govern.
Union security agreements take many forms," one such form being an
agency shop provision, which is sometimes referred to as a "support money
clause" or a "bargaining agent fee clause." This is an arrangement whereby
all employees of a given company, whether union members or not, pay a sum
of money to defray the expenses incurred by the union in acting as their
bargaining agent. Agreements such as this were approved under the W.L.B."
and under the N.L.R.A., section 8(a) (3). 12
The Higgins court was faced with the realization that, if Kansas could
not prohibit an agency 'shop agreement under section 14(b), their right-to-
work amendment would be left hollow and without effect. In the maze of
the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act, the court found that Congress
had intended to place the power to proscribe an agency shop agreement in
the hands of the states, and based its decision on this finding." Primary
evidence pointed to the fact that Congress was aware of the varied pre-1947
state laws forbidding union security agreements, and that it passed section
14(b) in order to maintain the status quo.14
The important question as to whether or not a state, under the granted
authority of section 14(b), can prohibit an agency shop agreement by means
of a right-to-work law has never been litigated in the federal courts. Re-
cently, however, the N.L.R.B., in a 3-2 decision, ruled that under federal
law an employer need not negotiate an agency shop contract in a state (in
this case Indiana) which has a right-to-work law." In reaching this decision,
8
 Here Congress intended to distinguish "membership" from the payment of dues
and fees, which resulted in the union being unable to compel the discharge of an em-
ployee who was willing to pay the dues and fees, but who was unable to comply with
other requisites of "membership." Union Starch and Refining Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 108 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951). See
Radio Officers Union v. National Labor Relations Board, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
0 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136, (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958).
10 See Union Contract Clauses, §§ 51075-84, C.C.H. (1954); Witney, Government &
Collective Bargaining, c. 13 (1951).
11 See 12 War Labor Board Reports 510; 21 War Labor Board Reports 219.
12
 American Seating Company, 98 N.L.R.B. 800 (1952); In re Public Service Com-
pany, 89 N.L.R.B. 418 (1950).
N.L.R.B., Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, vol. 1,
pp. 324, 564 (1948).
14 93 Cong. Rec. 6378 (1947).
15
 General Motors Corporation, 1961 C.C.H., N.L.R.B. § 9663, rev'd, 133 N.L.R.B.
21, 48 L.R.R.M. 1659 (1961), in a 4-1 decision on the basis of the Radio Officers case,
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Chairman Leedom interpreted "membership" as used in sections 7 and 8 of
the Taft-Hartley Act to mean literal membership. This he felt was the only
proper definition of "membership" in light of a recent Indiana holding 18
which so defined "membership" as used in that state's right-to-work law (as
passed under section 14(b)), since it was Congress' intent to define "mem-
bership" consistently throughout the Taft-Hartley Act. This decision is not
in accord with the Radio Union and the Union Starch cases17 as to the inter-
pretation of "membership" as used in sections 7 and 8; and as to the inter-
pretation of "membership" as used in section 14(b); it is in accord with
Meade Electric Co. v. Hagberg,18 but not with the Higgins case. The Hig-
gins court distinguished Meade on the ground that there a penal statute
was the subject of interpretation and not a constitutional amendment. But
the Higgins court failed to distinguish the General Motors case; rather it
cited the case for a proposition which it does not support. 4°
Having decided the propriety of the state's enacting a right-to-work
amendment, the Higgins court posed the issue of whether or not an agency
shop agreement violated the Kansas amendment. Article 15, section 12 of
the Kansas constitution forbids any person to enter into an agreement
whereby employment must be obtained or retained "because of member-
ship ... in any labor organization." To ascertain the meaning of "mem-
bership," the court sought the common understanding of the word, and
examined the circumstances attending the adoption of the amendment. 2°
By employing a liberal interpretation of the amendment, as suggested by a
noted jurist,21 the Kansas court found no difficulty in concluding that an
agency shop provision was encompassed within the prohibition of article 15,
section 12.
Does the Kansas court have jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief under
the right-to-work amendment? The Supreme Court of the United States
has held that states are precluded from granting injunctive relief for conduct
clearly prohibited22 or regulated22 by federal law. The Court has further
stated that this preemption doctrine is necessary to avoid conflict between
state and federal remedies applicable to the same conduct.24 To insure the
supra note 8. Although the majority claimed to be deciding solely on federal law, and
not on § 14(b) or right-to-work laws, there are overtones to the contrary.
18
 Meade Electric Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959).
17 Supra note 8. Dissenters Rodgers and Fanning rested their decisions on this fact.
18 Supra note 16.
10 The General Motors case was abstracted in the same paragraph in which this
quotation appears: "But for the Kansas 'right-to-work' law the agency shop provision
would presumably be a proper subject of negotiation in a collective bargaining agree-
ment under the Taft-Hartley Act." 360 P.2d 456, 467 (Kan. 1961). Chairman Leedom
specifically did not rule on the legality of an agency shop in a state with no right-to-
work law.
20
 State v. Sessions, 8.4 Kan. 856, 115 Pac. 641 (1911).
21 1 Story on the Constitution, § 451 (5th ed. 1905).
22 United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Floor Covering Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
23 Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S.
485 (1953).
24 Weber v. Anhauser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955) ; Garner v. Teamsters Union,
supra note 23.
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continued absence of conflict in this area, primary jurisdiction has been
given to the N.L.R.B. in cases which involve conduct "arguably" subject
to the N.L.RA.2 At first glance this doctrine appears clearly to delineate
its area of application. Upon closer examination, the doctrine, especially
in the field of union security agreements, is anything but clear.
In 1949 the United States Supreme Court, in Algoma Plywood & Veneer
Co. v. Wisconsin Labor Relations Board," ruled that by virtue of section
14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act the states do have jurisdiction, save in those
areas "where State and federal laws have parallel provisions." 27
 However,
the Plankington,28
 Farnsworth," and Youngdahl" cases reveal a possible
restriction of, or overruling of, the Algoma decision, as in those cases the
Court indicated disapproval of the attempts of various states to exercise
restrictive policies in the area of union security agreements. Yet another
reverse in the position was indicated when Algoma was cited with approval
in subsequent landmark cases. 31
 Then in 1959 the Court seemingly emascu-
lated Algoma a second time by its decision in San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon, 32
 wherein it ruled that the states lack jurisdiction in
25
 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
26 Supra note 6.
27 Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wiscinsin Labor Relations Board, supra note
6 at 313. In this case the Wisconsin Board ordered an employer to cease and desist
from enforcing a "maintenance of membership" clause in a collective bargaining agree-
ment on the grounds that such clause was in violation of a state statute. The opinion
notes that 95% of the employer's production was sold in interstate commerce. It was
here said: "Other provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act make it even clearer than the
National Labor Relations Act that the States are left free to pursue their own more
restrictive policies in the matter of union security agreements. Because sec. 8(a) (3) of
the new act forbids the closed shop and strictly regulates the conditions under which
a union shop agreement may be entered, sec. 14(b) was included to forestall the in-
ference that federal policy was to be exclusive." Supra note 6, at 313.
28
 Plankington Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 338 U.S.
953 (1950). In this case the lower court held it to be an unfair labor practice where
the union engaged in tactics to coerce the employer to discharge an employee for exer-
cising his right to refrain from union membership. The United States Supreme Court
reversed in a per curiam decision.
29
 Local Union 429, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, A.F. of L. v.
Farnsworth and Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969 (1957). In this case management was
alleged to have refused to hire union labor in violation of the Tennessee right-to-work
law. The union then picketed peacefully. Management sought and received an injunc-
tion from the state court which was approved by the supreme court of the state. On
appeal the Supreme Court reversed citing the Weber and Garner cases, supra notes 23, 24.
50 Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957). In this case the employees
struck and picketed a plant in an effort to compel the employer to recognize the union
as the bargaining agent of the employees. Picketing was accompanied by conduct
calculated to provoke violence. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed a blanket injunc-
tion against all conduct as issued by the lower court. The United States Supreme
Court reversed to the extent that the injunction prohibited peaceful picketing regulated
by the Taft-Hartley Act.
31 Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra note 23; Weber v. Anhauser-Busch, Inc.,
supra note 24; and Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
32 Supra note 25.
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areas "arguably" subject to the N.L.R.A. Faced with the shifting tides of
federal preemption in this area, the Higgins court used the Algoma case as
precedent, and the legislative history of section 14(b) 88 as supporting evi-
dence, to sanction the jurisdiction of the lower court. In reaching this con-
clusion, the court reported that all of the cases" which the union alleged to
have caused the decline and ultimate reversal of the Algoma decision, were
concerned with independent conduct which was either prohibited or regulated
by section 8 and not the application of a union security agreement. A recent
case in the State of Arizona seems to be in full accord with this conclusion."
The Higgins court felt the pressure of the wording of the Garmon case,"
for it made mention of its existence and then cursorily dismissed it as not
controlling. Can it be said that an agency shop provision is not "arguably"
under the Taft-Hartley Act?
A petition for certiorari in the Higgins case is now pending before the
Supreme Court. 87 If the Court should grant this petition, its final decision
will be noteworthy. Here in one case the Court will be presented with two
issues of great contemporary importance in the field of labor law. The
doctrine of federal preemption has been both important and controversial
since the founding of our Federal Government. State judicial powers
are jealously guarded, especially powers to enforce their own laws. Of no
less importance is the place of the agency shop in collective bargaining. If
the Court, in its wisdom, concludes that the Taft-Hartley Act does not grant
to the states the power to proscribe an agency shop, twenty right-to-work 88
statutes will become almost useless. It is hoped that the Supreme Court will
seize this opportunity to clarify at last part of these two much disputed areas.
EDWARD A. SCHWARTZ
33 See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 34, 40, 44; H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
.510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 60; 93 Cong. Rec. 3554, 3559, 4904, 6383-84, 6446; H.R.
3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., as reported, 13.
34 See supra notes 28-30.
85 Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. Nichols, 360 P.2d 204
(Ariz. 1961). Here the Arizona Supreme Court held that § 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act
gave state courts jurisdiction to enforce any violations of their right-to-work taw,
despite the recognized fact that the defendant company in this case was concerned with
interstate commerce and the conduct involved was clearly violative of the Taft-Hartley
Act.
36 Supra note 25.
37 Letter from J. D. Lysaught, Esq., Counsel for Kansas State Chamber of Com-
merce (amicus curiae), to the B.C. Ind. and Corn. L. Rev., July 19, 1961.
38
 Ala. Code tit. 26 § 375 (Supp. 1955) ; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1302 (1956) ;
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-202 (1960) ; Fla. Const. Decl. of Rts. § 12 (Supp. 1955) ; Ga. Code
Ann. § 54-902 (Supp. 1958) ; Ind. Stat. Ann. § 40-2703 (Supp. 1959) ; Iowa Code Ann.
§ 736A (1950) ; Miss. Code Ann. § 6984.5 (Supp. 1958) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-217
(1952) ; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 613,250 (1957) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-79 (1959) ; N.D. Rev.
Code § 34-9114 (Supp. 1957) ; S.C. Code § 40-46 (Supp. 1959) ; S.D. Code § 17.1101
(Supp. 1952) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-208 (1955) ; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat, art. 5154(g)
(Supp. 1959) ; Utah Code Ann. § 34-16-4 (Supp. 1959) ; Va. Code Ann. § 40-69 (1953).
93
